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ABSTRACT 
 
Background 
Dual-process theory suggests that Type 1 thinking results in a propensity to make ‘intuitive’ 
decisions based on limited information. Type 2 processes, on the other hand, are able to 
analyse these initial responses and replace them with rationalised decisions. Individuals may 
have a preference for different modes of rationalisation, on a continuum from careful to 
cursory. These ‘dispositions’ of thinking reside in type 2 processes, and may result in error 
when the preference is for ‘quick and casual’ decision-making.  
 
Methods  
We asked clinicians to answer a cognitive puzzle to which there was an obvious, but 
incorrect, answer, to measure their propensity for ‘quick and casual’ decision-making. The 
same clinicians were also asked to report the number of clinical errors they had committed 
in the previous two weeks. We hypothesized an association between committing error and 
settling for an incorrect answer, and that the cognitive puzzle would have predictive 
capability. 
 
Results 
Ninety of 153 (59%) clinicians reported that they had committed error, while 103 (67%) gave 
the incorrect ‘intuitive’ answer to the cognitive puzzle. There was no statistically significant 
difference between clinicians who committed error and answered incorrectly, and those 
who did not and answered correctly  (χ2 (1, n=1153)=0.021, p=0.885).  
 
Conclusions 
The prevalence of clinical error in our study was higher than previously reported in the 
literature, and the propensity for accepting intuitive solutions was high. Although the 
cognitive puzzle was unable to predict who was more likely to commit error, the study offers 
insights into developing other predictive models for error.  
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Introduction 
 
Solutions to medical error are more likely to lie in cognitive science rather than in medical 
science.1 The advantage to explaining errors in the light of underlying cognitive mechanisms 
is that understanding of these may lead to effective preventive measures. There is now a 
mature body of evidence that decision-making is the result of dual system thinking, and 
although there is some criticism of this theoretical model, there is sufficient empirical 
evidence to support it.2 Thinking is believed to be the result of two distinctive processing 
types - type 1 processes are rapid and autonomous, and characterized by offering default 
responses; and type 2 processes are slow and deliberative, and capable of reflecting on the 
responses and either modifying or rejecting them in favor of a more or less rationalised 
response. The former results in minimal cognitive load, whereas the later is load intensive.   
 
Notwithstanding the arguments for different terminologies relating to the underlying 
processes, we shall refer to the parts interchangeably as type/system 1 processes and 
type/system 2 processes. Type 1 processes tend to be associative and have minimal 
requirement for working memory. Importantly, these processes are also responsible for 
implicit learning and therefore give rise to the automatic responses of highly learned 
associations, where the associations that result from repeated experiences are dominant to 
the point of automaticity.3 
 
Some workers describe a ‘toggling’ function between type 1 and type 2 processes and that 
the ultimate decision is a blend of type 1 and type 2 processing – indeed the optimal 
decision-making strategy is the correct ‘dose’ of the two systems.4 However, another school 
of thought separates type 2 processes into two distinct modes of thinking, which describe 
thinking dispositions of type 2 processing.5 The modes share the characteristic of always 
requiring working memory, but the styles of thinking may be anywhere on the continuum of 
slow and careful to quick and casual, and they constantly vary.2 Modes of thinking also differ 
between individuals, personalities, and different cultures.6,7 
 
Conceptually therefore, there is a trio of ‘minds’ – the autonomous mind (type 1 processes), 
the algorithmic mind (responsible for complex computation), and the reflective mind 
(responsible for weighing choices).2 These minds display a hierarchical structure of control. 
The autonomous mind can be overridden by the algorithmic mind, which in turn is 
subordinate to the reflective mind, the highest level of regulation (figure 1).  
This tripartite model is an extension of the dual processes model of cognition, and explains 
‘irrationality’ in decision-making, with the reflective mind as its locus. Intelligence and 
rationality are separate constructs. The computational ability associated with our traditional 
understanding of intelligence and the ability to perform in IQ tests is directly attributable to 
the algorithmic mind. It is determined by the cognitive capacity of individuals, i.e. the 
working memory capacity, which is highly correlated with IQ. In contrast, the reflective mind 
is a thinking disposition that has the capability to collect and weigh up information before 
coming to a decision.5 
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The relationship between system 1 and system 2 is best characterised as default-
interventionist,8,9 where type 1 processing generates a default response, while type 2 
processes have the facility to intervene. There is therefore the potential for intuitive 
responses to be overridden and replaced by reflective reasoning. However, the tendency to 
override relies on several factors, for example the strength of confidence in the intuitive 
response.3 This does not require accuracy of intuition, merely confidence. Another factor 
influencing the overriding of system 1 is the thinking disposition of the reflective Mind. 
System 1 is always switched on, and intervention will only kick in to exert the effort of using 
working memory if it has to – in conditions of difficulty, higher motivation or novelty.  
 
From experimental data in the field of cognitive psychology, it has been found that certain 
simple logic puzzles can be predictive of a predisposition for system 2 thinking to be 
overconfident when presented with ‘intuitive’ solutions. One such puzzle is shown below 
(based on the ‘bat and ball’ puzzle), which offers an intuitive (but incorrect) response of 
10mg.10 
 
The dose of a combination drug (Drug A + Drug B) is 110mg 
Drug A is 100mg more than Drug B 
What is the dose of Drug B?  
 
The immediate response of 10mg is the result of system 1’s acceptance of the ‘obvious’ 
answer, which system 2 has the opportunity to reject or accept. Acceptance implies an 
unwillingness of system 2 to expend the effort of using working memory to reflect on and 
compute the correct answer. Although the mind has the option to apply rationality to 
intuitive judgments, a feature of type 2 thinking is that it is inherently ‘lazy’ and is therefore 
susceptible to suggestions from system 1, particularly when these are made confidently. This 
is despite system 1 intuitions being inaccurate under conditions of high uncertainty. In a 
clinical context this may conceivably result in incorrect clinical decisions, which lead to errors 
of judgment. The ‘laziness’ of type 2 processes may be explained by a preference for a quick 
and casual mode of thinking originating in the reflective mind.  
 
If this thinking disposition is indeed a preference in the same way as handedness is, then it 
may be postulated that the resulting decision-making in conditions of complexity could 
theoretically lead to error more frequently. Knowing this propensity would enable individual 
clinicians with this preference to heighten their vigilance to committing error or even 
rationalise career choices to roles less exposed to dynamic and unpredictable environments.  
 
This study has the twofold aim of assessing the propensity of clinicians to opt for a 
superficially correct answer to this cognitive puzzle, and their self-reported rate of 
committing clinical error. We aimed to test for an association between incorrect answers to 
the puzzle and committing recent clinical errors. We hypothesised that the cognitive puzzle 
may be predictive of susceptibility by the reflective mind to cognitive errors, and that this 
susceptibility may manifest itself in clinical errors. An accepted taxonomy of errors is defined 
using Reason’s classification of slips, lapses, mistakes and violations, based on the clinician’s 
‘intention’, and in answer to the questions; were the actions directed by a prior intention?; 
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Did the actions proceed as planned?; Did they achieve their desired end?11 Based on this 
definition, error can be classified as: 
- Slips: actions not carried out as intended or planned, e.g. inadvertently dialing the wrong 
number.  
- Lapses: missed actions and omissions, i.e. forgetting something owing to lapse of memory 
or inattention. 
-  Mistakes: caused by a faulty plan/intention, i.e. making a wrong decision or doing the 
wrong procedure. 
- Violations: deliberate illegal actions, i.e. performing acts that are known to be ‘against the 
rules’. 
 
Violations were excluded as a cause of error from this study since it implies a conscious 
decision to commit the error, rather than the error resulting from faulty cognition.  
 
Methodology 
 
A questionnaire was designed to include the two ‘critical’ questions of how many errors 
were committed by responding clinicians in the past two weeks (with definitions provided), 
and the cognitive puzzle shown above. Two more clinical questions were included to lessen 
hypervigilance to the cognitive puzzle, and so promote a type 1 thinking process. 
 
The study sample was drawn from a cohort of clinicians attending simulation-based training 
courses at our institution. These clinicians were invited to participate in the study after a 
description of its aim to assess thinking style and its association with error.  
 
Ethics  
Anonymity was guaranteed and participants who did not wish to participate could return 
their questionnaires blank without the researcher being aware of their non-participation. In 
this way responding and non-responding clinicians could not be distinguished by the 
researchers. Full ethics approval was obtained from the Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
of Anglia Ruskin University (FREP 16/17 083). 
 
Statistical analysis 
All data was treated as categorical, and a Chi Square test was used to compare groups, with 
an a priori level of significance (alpha error) set at 0.05. The end points measured were self-
reported errors and the number of clinicians settling for the incorrect answer to the 
cognitive puzzle. 
 
Results 
 
There were 153 participants invited to take part in the study, with 153 completed returns 
(response rate 100%). Of these, 90 (59%) reported committing an error in the past two 
weeks, and 103 (67%) provided an incorrect answer to the cognitive puzzle. Where some 
respondents (2, 1.3%) did not provide an answer but stated that 10mg was incorrect, we 
categorised these as correct since they were clearly alerted to the falsity of the ‘obvious’ 
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solution. When grouped as those giving the correct answer versus those giving an incorrect 
answer, the number of participants committing or not committing error is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Cross-tabulation was performed with the different groups (table 1), and the chi square test 
failed to show a statistically significant difference between the groups (χ2 (1, n=1153)=0.021, 
p=0.885).  
 
 
Table 1. Cross tabulation of respondents who answered the cognitive 
puzzle correctly and incorrectly, and who committed error in the 
previous two weeks. 
 Answer Total 
Correct Incorrect  
Committed 
error 
No  21 (33%) 42 (67%) 63 (41%) 
Yes  29 (32%) 61 (68%) 90 (59%) 
Total  50 (33%) 103 (67%) 153 (100%) 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
A large number of clinicians reported having committed at least one clinical error in the 
previous two weeks compared with reports in other studies. Wu et al found that 45% of 
surveyed house officers reported committing an error, which included the categories of 
diagnostic (33%), prescribing (29%), evaluation (21%), communication (5%) and procedural 
(11%) errors.12 For diagnostic errors alone the range has consistently been found to be 
around 10 – 30%,13 and for prescribing error a rate of around 7%.14,15 Since the seminal 
Institute of Medicine report in 2000,16 which gave prominence to the issue of medical error 
there has been an acceptance that it is something to be admitted to and spoken about, and 
our high number may reflect a growing willingness by clinicians to admit their own fallibility 
as part of a systems failure.   
 
A significant majority of clinicians provided an incorrect answer to the cognitive puzzle. 
There are no previous data to provide a reference for this performance, except a range of 50 
– 80% incorrect responses by US university students to the original ‘bat and ball’ puzzle.10 
However, given that the puzzle has been presented in a medical context, it may be argued 
that it behaves as a surrogate of a drug calculation and reflects the potential for committing 
errors of prescribing. However, the question is not validated to perform this function, but 
may form an interesting line of investigation.  
 
An observation that was not a formal part of the study, but was made by the researchers 
was that several of the respondents who answered correctly appeared to display a 
realization that ‘something was wrong’, before calculating the correct answer. Although this 
study did not set out to measure any actual processes used to arrive at the answer, this 
observation of an internal alarm sounding offers a potential route of investigation for 
measures to counteract a ‘lazy’ thinking mode. This phenomenon of an internal alarm could 
be a sign of cognitive ‘dis-ease’ (or cognitive strain),10,17 which provokes a cautious 
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disposition of type 2 thinking. A principle step in Type 2 processes overriding system 1 
intuitions is this process of metacognition, which only occurs when system 2 is alerted to the 
possibility that all is not well and system 1 may be wrong.18 The implication is that a 
potential solution to ‘lazy’ thinking is to induce cognitive dis-ease, and so trigger a cautious 
and analytic disposition. The concept has been proposed as a ‘debiasing’ strategy. Although 
debiasing strategies are not universal and need to be customized for particular biases,4 the 
starting point of sparking vigilance may be universally applicable. Raising awareness of the 
potential for bias in clinical decision-making is the first step to clinicians correcting 
themselves.19 
 
The number of clinicians committing error and opting for the incorrect answer was not 
significantly different to those not committing error and giving the incorrect answer. There 
may be a number of reasons for this non-significance, including an insensitivity of the 
cognitive puzzle to detect a quick and casual thinking disposition, self-reporting of error not 
accurately reflecting true rate of error, or indeed the non-association proving the null 
hypothesis of there being no association. The other possibility is that thinking dispositions 
may not be stable in individuals and may change with context. While the algorithmic mind 
has trait-like characteristics (and is stable), the reflective mind may have state-like elements 
that change with circumstance.6 Therefore, thinking dispositions may change under different 
conditions, for example with changing cognitive load. The cognitive puzzle was administered 
under the conditions of a ‘classroom test’. If administered under conditions similar to the 
more dynamic and stressful clinical conditions in which error often occurs, it may achieve 
predictive capability.   
 
There are limitations to this study.  Error was self-reported, with the potential for inaccuracy 
through under-reporting and hindsight bias. However, this is likely to result in 
underestimation so that the reported frequency is a conservative estimate of the true 
frequency. Thinking disposition may be context-sensitive and, as indicated, the puzzle was 
administered under different condition to those the errors may have occurred in.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Dual process thinking is commonly described as a straightforward relationship between 
system 1 and system 2, with potential solutions being ‘debiasing strategies’ that subject 
intuitive judgements to type 2 analytic scrutiny. This view sees type 2 processes as being 
‘reliable, safe and effective’.4 However, type 2 processes are not necessarily consistent, 
either within or between individual clinicians. Theorising that Type 2 thinking displays 
‘dispositions’ that occupy a spectrum between quick and casual to slow and careful, begs the 
question of whether these preferences are stable and can be predicted, and therefore may 
suggest strategies that can be tailored to individuals and contexts.  
 
No other study has attempted to describe an association between ‘failure’ of the reflective 
mind of system 2 as demonstrated by incorrect completion of a cognitive test, and 
propensity to committing clinical error. Even though this study did not show such an 
association it is still plausible, but may need a different approach to demonstrate it. What 
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this study has shown is a very high rate of reported clinical error, as well as a high 
susceptibility for clinicians to accept type 1 suggestions, which suggests that further 
investigation should be undertaken to search for an association. At the very least this study’s 
negative results point to different directions that should be explored. Future investigations 
should test thinking dispositions in near-authentic conditions in a simulated environment. A 
simulated clinical environment can provide a dynamic clinical problem that may offer 
‘intuitive’, but suboptimal, solutions, that would lead directly to error if taken. In this way 
causality between decision and error can be demonstrated. Also, it more closely replicates 
the ‘flesh and blood decision making’ that occurs in clinical environments,11 rather than it 
being a purely cognitive exercise.  
 
 
Main messages 
• Two thirds of practicing clinicians report having committed a clinical error in the 
previous 2 weeks. 
• Two thirds of practicing clinicians display a ‘quick and casual’ thinking disposition when 
faced with a cognitive puzzle. 
• Tests of thinking disposition should occur in contexts that replicate conditions 
predisposing to error. 
 
Current research questions 
• Can predisposition to committing clinical errors be predicted by using cognitive tests of 
decision-making? 
• Are thinking dispositions that are used for clinical decision-making a stable trait-like 
phenomenon, or do they change with the context of the decision? 
• Will inducing cognitive dis-ease (strain) change a thinking disposition to result in fewer 
errors? 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. The hierarchy of minds in System 1 and System 2 processes. The arrows indicate 
the direction of control. 
 
Figure 2. Bar chart showing how many respondents who answered the cognitive puzzle 
correctly and incorrectly committed error in the past two weeks.  
 
 
 
References 
 
1. Zhang J, Patel V, Johnson T. Medical Error: Is the solution medical or cognitive? J Am 
Med Inform Assoc 2002;9:S75–S77. 
2. Evans J, Stanovich K. Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate. 
Perspect Psychol Sci 2013;8:223–241. 
3. Thompson VA, Turner JP, Pennycock G. Intuition, reason and metacognition. Cognitive 
Psychol 2011;63:107–140. 
4. Croskerry P, Singhal G, Mamede S. Cognitive debiasing 1: origins of bias and theory of 
debiasing. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;0:1–7. 
5. Stanovich KE, West RF, Toplak ME. The complexity of developmental predictions from 
dual process models. Dev Rev, 2011:31:103–108. 
6. Stanovich KE, West RF. Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability. Thinking 
Reasoning 2007;13:225–247. 
7. Nisbett R, Peng K, Choi I, et al. Culture and systems of thought: Holistic vs. analytic 
cognition. Psychol Rev, 2001;108:291–310. 
8. Stanovich KE, Toplak ME. Defining features versus incidental correlates of type 1 and 
type 2 processing. Mind Soc, 2012:11:3–13. 
9. Evans J. On the resolution of conflict in dual- process theories of reasoning. Thinking 
Reasoning, 2007;13:321–329. 
10. Kahneman D. Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Books, 2011. 
11. Reason. Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
12. Wu AW, Folkman S, McPhee SJ, et al. Do house officers learn from their mistakes? JAMA 
1991;265:2089-2094. 
13. Graber ML. The incidence of diagnostic error in medicine. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:ii21–
ii27. 
14. Lewis P, Dornan T, Taylor D, et al. Prevalence, incidence and nature of prescribing errors 
in hospital inpatients: a systematic review. Drug Saf 2009;32:379-89. 
15. Ryan C, Ross S, Davey P, et al. (2014) Prevalence and Causes of Prescribing Errors: The 
PRescribing Outcomes for Trainee Doctors Engaged in Clinical Training (PROTECT) Study. 
PLoS ONE 2014;9:e79802. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079802. 
16. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS (editors). To err is human: building a safer health 
system. A report of the Committee on Health Quality in America, Institute of Medicine. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 2000. 
 10 
17. Isen A, Means B, Patrick R, et al. Chapter 11: Some factors influencing decision-making 
strategy and risk taking. In: Clark M, Fiske S (eds). Affect and Cognition: 17th Annual 
Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition (3rd Edition). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
New York: Psychology Press, 2014. 
18. Croskerry P, Nimmo G. Better clinical decision making and reducing diagnostic error. R 
Coll Physicians Edinb 2011;41:155–62. 
19. Croskerry P, Singhal G, Mamede S.  Cognitive debiasing 2: impediments to and strategies 
for change. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:ii65–ii72. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
